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Abstract—Almost every website, mobile application or cloud
service requires users to agree to a privacy policy, or similar terms
of service, detailing how the developer or service provider will
handle user data, and the purposes for which it will be used. Many
past works have criticised these documents on account of their
length, excessively complex wording, or the simple fact that users
typically do not read or understand them, and that potentially
invasive or wide-reaching terms are included in these policies. In
this paper, an automated approach and tool to gather and analyse
these policies is presented, and some important considerations for
these documents are highlighted, specifically those surrounding
past legal rulings over the enforceability of some specific and
widely-used contract terms — the ability for terms to be changed
without directly notifying users (and presumed continued use
indicates acceptance), and the protections in place in the event
of a sale or acquisition of a company. The concerns these pose to
user privacy and choice are highlighted, as well as the extent to
which these terms are found in policies and documents from many
popular websites. This tool was used to highlight how commonly
these terms are found, and the extent of this potential problem,
and explore potential solutions to the challenge of regulating user
privacy via such contracts in an era where mobile devices contain
significant quantities of highly sensitive personal data, which is
highly desirable to service operators, as a core valuation asset of
their company.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy policies, terms and conditions, and other legal
documents form a near-universal part of the experience of
using connectivity-based services today. Virtually every web-
site, mobile app, and even physical service provider has an
agreement of this form, to which users are required to agree,
in order to make use of the service. Often, however, these
agreements are stated to be implicitly accepted by accessing
or using a service, which gives rise to a number of consid-
erations surrounding the validity of these agreements. Online
agreements typically take the form of either a click-wrap [1],
or browse-wrap [2]. These names are derived from an early
form of software-related agreement, referred to shrink-wrap,
whereby a user was held to have accepted a software End
User License Agreement (EULA) by opening the shrink-wrap
seal on the physical packaging itself [3].
The premise of such agreements was originally that it
would be impractical for every user of a piece of software
to individually negotiate a contract of use with the company
providing the software, and record these agreements. As such,
the concept of offering a standard agreement, which users
accepted by using the software, was established. Such contracts
are very common, and when browsing the internet, users are
giving implicit consent.
Previous work has considered privacy policies, and proto-
cols for computer-readable representations of such policies,
such as P3P [4], allow web browsers to enforce a user’s
privacy choices. The automated processing of policies for the
generation of computer-readable policies has also been carried
out [5]. Despite P3P being a formally ratified standard of
W3C, it has seen little traction, and has been shown to be
abused by website operators [6] to work around restrictions
on their sites put in place by user privacy policies. Some basic
privacy-related enforcement is carried out in permissions on
mobile platforms and web browsers (and these are computer-
readable), although these focus simply on restricting access to
data, rather than on restricting its use, which was the primary
focus of the privacy policies reviewed.
Other work has highlighted a major limitation of P3P
version 1, being that policies are only accepted or rejected,
without scope for partial acceptance or rejection, or feedback
to the service provider [7]. Privacy is a key consideration for
future network services and applications, as even the simplest
of software becomes increasingly connected, as it expands onto
users’ mobile devices (themselves holding large quantities of
personal information).
In recent years, the rise in the tendency for companies to
build their businesses around the prospect of making money
as a result of data gathered from the users of an (otherwise)
free-to-use service has been clear. Indeed, as Bruce Schneier
stated in a conference talk in 2010: “Don’t make the mistake of
thinking you’re Facebook’s customer, you’re not – you’re the
product,” [8]. With the rise in free (at point of use) services on
the internet, designed to encourage users to engage with them
for the purpose of gaining a larger user-base, which itself is
then used as an asset [9],
This paper firstly explores some legal precedents in contract
law which are relevant to the terms encountered in privacy
policies. It then explores the presented approach to automated
identification of terms of interest within policies, as well as
trends identified through an analysis of privacy policies of
popular services and websites. Finally, potential points for
future discussion are identified, and a set of recommendations
for ensuring users’ right to privacy is respected when using
online and mobile services are made.
II. RELATED WORKS
A number of previous works have considered privacy
policies, their implications, and their design. In particular,
the concept of privacy by design, originally proposed by
Canada’s Information & Privacy Commissioner, has since
been resolved as a standard for global privacy at the 32nd
International Conference of Data Protection and Information
Privacy Commissioners. The principles of privacy by design
were presented as a set of 7 “foundation principles”, designed
to be used be applied to products and services as a principle
during the development phase. These principles state that;
• Privacy should be built preemptively into products,
rather than introduced as a reaction or response to
risks or breaches,
• The maximum level of privacy should be enabled by
default, without the user having to make a selection
to achieve this,
• Privacy should be embedded into the architecture of
both technology and business processes, so privacy
is inherent throughout, rather than merely reducing
functionality when invoked by users,
• Users should not be required to choose between pri-
vacy or a feature, as trade-offs should be minimised
or eliminated,
• Privacy should be integrated end-to-end, from before
data enters the system, to its timely destruction when
it is no longer needed,
• Business practices and technology should be transpar-
ent, scrutinised, and verified to be operating correctly,
so users can place trust based on this verification, and
• Privacy should be the utmost priority, with user-
friendly and user-centric privacy options, to make it
easy for individuals to protect their privacy. [10]
One important area of previous research which may make
practical many of the principles of data protection by de-
fault is that of privacy-preserving Attribute-based Credentials
(Privacy-ABCs), which allow for attribute-based verification of
users, without requiring the full disclosure of identity or the
other related attributes [11]. For example, using Privacy-ABCs,
it would be possible for a user to show they were a member
of a given restricted set or group, without having to disclose
details of other sets they belong to, or disclose their individual
identity. This technology offers the ability to further many
of the principles of minimisation of data, and to reduce the
need for storage or processing of sensitive data when Privacy-
ABCs could be used to verify an operation without processing
sensitive information.
The Terms of Service; Didn’t Read project also offers users
a novel approach to privacy policies, with curated and user-
submitted interpretations of policies used to grade policies
with a simple letter-grade, along with a selection of key
positives and negatives [12]. This system, integrated with
browser plugins, provides users with a rapid way to gain an
understanding of the implications of a policy, at least in the
interpretation of other users.
Previous work has also highlighted the problem of a lack of
clear regulation and standard baselines when privacy policies
are considered [13], where a lack of standard language, and
standard content addressed in them presents effectively differ-
ent policies, making it difficult to compare privacy policies.
Jensen also highlighted the problem surrounding the non-
negotiable nature of website policies, given the non-negotiable
nature, and the lack of user leverage or voice to request or set
new terms. This highlights that the problem of the one-way
nature of such agreement is not a new one, and that subsequent
years have not led to any significant changes here, as the results
of this investigation shall show.
The importance of privacy preservation on the internet
has also been previously explored, and likened to the ability
to have relative privacy within regular, offline day-to-day
life [14]. Culnan and Armstrong highlighted the dependency of
businesses on gathering, and processing customer data in large
quantities, and the trade-off between value for the company,
and privacy for the customer [15]. The use of procedural
fairness was proposed, where the presence of fair procedures
for protecting individual users’ privacy would lead to cus-
tomers being willing to disclose personal information, and
found that where procedural fairness practices were applied,
privacy concerns were not the distinguishing factor between
customers willing and not willing to be profiled, indicating
customer acceptance.
III. LEGAL PRECEDENTS
A. Alterations to Contracts
In Douglas v. US District Court ex rel. Talk America,
(Case 06-75424), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that one party cannot unilaterally alter the terms of a contract.
The grounds for this were that modified terms remain an
offer to change the terms, until the terms are accepted. The
judgement also stated “In California, a contract can be proce-
durally unconscionable if a service provider has overwhelming
bargaining power and presents a “take-it-or-leave-it” contract
to a customer — even if the customer has a meaningful
choice as to service providers”, referring to the 9th Circuit
case of Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc. (69 F.3d 1257, 1283) in
California. This is of interest, as a large number of technology
companies are based in Calfornia, and make one of their terms
of use that the agreement is covered by US law.
The Douglas ruling specifically highlighted the questions
posed where a contract is modified, with the only notice given
by posting a revised version. This is of interest with regard to
the legal documents and privacy policies found on websites,
since of the top 10 websites investigated, all except Amazon
contained a clause indicating that continued use of a service
indicated acceptance of the policy changes. The original case
of Douglas v. Talk America pertained to the enforceability of a
change in contract to add a mandatory arbitration clause. The
judgement discussed the impracticality of requiring a user to
check for updates to contracts or agreements for every service
they use, and highlighted that if a user was not aware of the
change, the user cannot agree to the offer for change unless
they are aware of it, per Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord,
A Treatise on the Law of Contracts.
When reviewing privacy policies of a number of popular
websites (as discussed in Section IV), Google was identified
as the only service to give a firm commitment to not reduce
privacy protections without obtaining “explicit consent” of
users. The majority of services made no specific commitment
to directly notify users (perhaps using a direct message, or an
email) of changes to policies, although many did state they
may do it in some cases, although it was found (for the case
of Twitter, for example), that this was only if (at their own
sole discretion) they decided a change was material.
Clearly there is a balance to be obtained here between
notifying users of every single trivial change to a policy, and
allowing changes to policies to be made without specifically
contacting users. In light of the previously US-based legal
rulings covering such changes, however, there is a strong argu-
ment to be made that all changes to website terms or contracts
should require explicit acknowledgement and consent, to be
binding.
B. Explicit Consent to Alterations
A second matter, however, covers implicit acceptance,
where continued use of a service, after its terms are up-
dated, or after a period of time, is taken by the company
to indicate agreement with the updated terms. In the case
of Nagrampa v. MailCoups, the court highlighted the over-
whelming bargaining power of one party over the other, and
that the alterations were presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it”
basis. Since alterations to website policies are typically carried
out as such (without provision made for users unwilling to
agree to the new terms), this ruling may prove relevant when
considering internet-based services, as the provider holds a
position of overwhelming bargaining power (by being able
to prevent a user from accessing their own data until they
accept new terms). This position may well form the grounds for
modifications to be deemed unfair, on account of the imbalance
of bargaining power between user and service provider.
This is also inkeeping with UK unfair contracts law guid-
ance [16], which is itself derived from a European directive,
meaning that similar terms should exist throughout the Euro-
pean Union. It appears that contracts between users and service
providers are inherently designed with an imbalance, given the
service provider is able to dictate that a user accessing their
own data (held on the service) must accept new and modified
terms, with the user having no clear option to access their
data without accepting those terms. Indeed, in some cases,
users may not need to even use the service, as acceptance was
in some cases presumed after a specific period of time. This
raises concerns for services where users are not given a clear
ability to remove all their data from a service (and terminate
their dealings with the company). Another consideration here
is whether it is fair or reasonable for a user to no longer have
access to a service, simply on account of their objection to a
unilateral modification to the contract, which was not in place
when they accepted the agreement. Had they been aware of
the intention of the provider to make this change, they may
never have used it, or may have used an alternative.
C. Transfer of Data Following Acquisition
A common term seen within privacy policies and terms of
service covers the ownership (and transfer of) user or customer
data, in the event of the sale, acquisition or bankruptcy of the
company operating the service. These terms find their origins
as a result of a number of cases in the USA, where the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) successfully argued that a company
undergoing bankruptcy was bound by its original promises in
a privacy policy, such as to not sell private data, or to protect
it [17]. Specific examples include that of RadioShack and
Toysmart. While there has been considerable legal attention
given to the subject, online services are recognised as being
largely self-regulated, with regard to the handling of personal
data (through privacy policies), which is why the FTC seeks to
hold companies to account and ensure they honour their own
privacy policies [18].
As a result of this, it is common to see website and service
privacy policies clearly state that data may be transferred or
sold as part of a sale, bankruptcy or acquisition. By stating this
may happen, the company is acting within its own privacy
policy, and can likely continue with the sale unhindered.
Indeed, previous legal challenges brought forth by the FTC
have focused on holding companies to their own privacy
policies when attempts at selling user data are made, and in
the absence of legally binding protections for private data, it
appears acceptable for personal data to be sold as part of a
bankruptcy or acquisition, provided such a provision was made
in the privacy policy in question.
In order to investigate the prevalence of these kinds of
terms, an analysis of a number of privacy policies was carried
out, accelerated through the use of the presented toolkit, used
to identify potentially interesting contact and policy terms for
further analysis. These policies belong to the most popular web
and mobile-oriented services.
IV. AUTOMATIC PROCESSING
To gain a clear understanding of the extent to which
some of the concerns highlighted in Section III are found in
policies available today, a toolkit was created for the purpose
of analysing these policies. The toolkit accepts a CSV list
of top website domain names (the Alexa listing being one
widely known example of such a dataset). In order to simplify
analysis, at this point only sites using the ‘.com’ and ‘.co.uk’
top-level domains are considered, since these sites typically
feature their legal policies in English. In future, detecting
website language based on the page content would allow for
this to be expanded, and would allow for non-English website
policies to be processed, provided suitable policy definitions
were created for the language in question.
The identified websites were then accessed on their default
“www” subdomain prefix by the automated tool, and the
homepage was loaded into an HTML parser, which identified
all hyperlinks within the page containing a phrase relevant to
legal policies. These links were then followed, and the policy
documents gathered and scanned for strings likely to be of
interest in investigating the transfer of personal data, or the
alteration of policies. At this time, the phrases shown in Table I
were used, which were themselves selected from the top 20
websites.
V. CHALLENGES IN AUTOMATED PROCESSING
In the process of carrying out this automated processing,
a number of challenges were identified when attempting to
TABLE I. QUERY TERMS
Hyperlink Query String Page Content String
terms transfer
privacy acqui
legal merge
amend
modif
notif
automate the process of extracting key privacy policy informa-
tion. Firstly, as discussed previously in Section IV, websites
written in languages other than English were not considered
at this time, although the process could be applied to websites
of any language provided suitable experience was available
for identifying suitable query strings. Secondly, the challenge
of ambiguity in links was also identified, where a website
may contain more than one link mentioning “privacy” or
“terms”. Two potential approaches to handle this scenario were
identified. One approach was to use the link with the shortest
visible text, since articles mentioning the query strings or
other, more generic pages about privacy tended to be qualified
with other words, such as “Major privacy scandal over...”. The
other approach was to use the link which was found last on
the page, since all websites investigated listed their privacy
policy at the footer of their page, which is conventionally listed
towards the end of the HTML in a page. One other potential
challenge identified (but not encountered on any of the most
popular websites investigated) was the use of javascript-based
hyperlinks to show a privacy policy. Since these would require
javascript code to execute in order for the policy to display,
retrieval of the destination of the hyperlink would not show
the policy. While this was not encountered on any websites
processed, it would potentially lead to the tool not detecting
any relevant policies on the page. For this reason, manual
supervision of the acquisition process remains necessary at
this point, to ensure the policy is identified correctly.
After identifying the relevant hyperlinks within a website,
a number of challenges were identified in attempting to auto-
matically process the policies themselves. While the process of
attempting to extract context of a query term by retrieving the
full HTML component within which the term appeared was
relatively successful, it was not always perfect. Specifically,
if a sentence was split (as is common when breaking up
lengthy legal statements using bullet points, or sub-sections),
the subsequent information was lost. To ensure that findings
were accurate for this work, the relevant terms of policies
were manually reviewed (within the regular context of the
full policy). By also taking into account the variations in use
of terminology, fully automated processing of these privacy
policies and other legal documents remains a significant hurdle.
Some relatively common words (such as merge, or modify),
are by definition necessary to highlight for the purpose of
identifying policy terms of interest, and are also likely to be
found in other contexts (such as users being able to modify
existing content), or indeed within in-page javascript content
to merge multiple objects together when rendering the web
page. The latter of these were able to be removed using length
filtering (to remove infeasibly long lines of content), although
parsing the string as javascript to verify syntax also allowed
these false positives to be removed.
VI. HANDLING OF CHANGES TO POLICIES
Two factors shall be considered in how services stated they
would handle changes to policies. Firstly, whether or not users
would be notified of change beyond a simple update to the
policy was considered. Secondly, whether or not a service
states that continued use of the service implies acceptance of
updated terms will be considered — this is to identify whether
or not users are giving informed consent to the changes, or
whether they are perhaps unaware of what they are agreeing to.
Given the OECD privacy guidelines focus on consent as one of
their key principles, this is an important means of verifying if
privacy protections in place are sufficient to protect users [19].
Google’s privacy policy stated that no changes will reduce
user rights under their privacy policy without explicit consent,
but did not specifically require itself to directly notify users
on each change — for “significant” changes, prominent notice
would be given, but this was not defined, and the meaning of
prominent and significant were not
Our Privacy Policy may change from time to time.
We will not reduce your rights under this Privacy
Policy without your explicit consent. We will post
any privacy policy changes on this page and, if
the changes are significant, we will provide a more
prominent notice (including, for certain services,
email notification of privacy policy changes). We
will also keep prior versions of this Privacy Policy
in an archive for your review. [20]
While Google’s policy did not explicitly state whether it
presumes implied consent when they alter their privacy policy,
the email they circulated during the merge of their privacy
policies in January 2012 stated, “If you choose to keep using
Google once the change occurs, you will be doing so under
the new Privacy Policy and Terms of Service”. This would
indicate that Google believes continued use of their services
indicates consent to the changes.
The Facebook privacy policy stated that “We’ll notify you
before we make changes to this policy and give you the op-
portunity to review and comment on the revised policy before
continuing to use our Services”, indicating that notification
would be carried out. While the ability to comment on revised
policies is one not commonly seen, their terms of service state
that consent is presumed if users continue to use Facebook;
“Your continued use of the Facebook Services, following
notice of the changes to our terms, policies or guidelines,
constitutes your acceptance of our amended terms, policies
or guidelines” [21].
Yahoo’s terms of service state that “if you do not agree to
the changes in the Terms, you should stop using the Yahoo
Services and Software”, indicating that they also view consent
as implicit if a user continues to use their service, and that
users have no means to opt out of changes to policies. Yahoo
did state in its privacy policy that “if we make any substantial
changes in the way we use your information we will notify you
by sending a notice to the primary email address specified in
your Yahoo account or by posting a prominent notice on our
pages” [22], indicating that notification of changes should take
place in some situations.
Twitter’s privacy policy stated that “If we make a change
to this policy that, in our sole discretion, is material, we will
notify you via an @Twitter update or email to the email
address associated with your account. By continuing to access
or use the Services after those changes become effective,
you agree to be bound by the revised Privacy Policy” [23].
This indicates that Twitter may in some situations choose
to alert users to changes, and that they presume consent if
a user accesses the service after these changes took effect.
It is also worth noting that the @Twitter account is a high-
activity account which regularly tweets and re-tweets content,
indicating that privacy update notices may not be highly visible
if only sent from that account.
Amazon offered a stronger committment to privacy policy
changes, stating that they will not change their policies to offer
less protection to previously-collected data without consent,
although there was no statement that customers would be
allowed to refuse these changes. Amazon did however state
that users should frequently check their website to see changes
to policies, an approach which has been viewed as unrealistic
by US courts in the case of Douglas v. US District Court ex
rel. Talk America, (Case 06-75424), as referred to above.
Our business changes constantly and our Privacy No-
tice and the Conditions of Use and Sale will change
also. We may e-mail periodic reminders of our
notices and conditions, unless you have instructed us
not to, but you should check our website frequently
to see recent changes. Unless stated otherwise, our
current Privacy Notice applies to all information that
we have about you and your account. We stand
behind the promises we make, however, and will
never materially change our policies and practices to
make them less protective of customer information
collected in the past without the consent of affected
customers [24].
The Wikipedia privacy policy stated that “your continued
use of the Wikimedia Sites after this Privacy Policy becomes
effective constitutes acceptance of this Privacy Policy on
your part” [25], indicating that they consider users implicitly
consenting to their privacy policy, and stated that notification
would be carried out for substantial changes, which would not
include changes such as “grammatical fixes, administrative or
legal changes, or corrections of inaccurate statements”;
In the event of substantial changes, we will provide
the proposed changes to our users in at least three
(3) languages (selected at our discretion) for open
comment period lasting at least thirty (30) calendar
days. Prior to the start of any comment period,
we will provide notice of such changes and the
opportunity to comment via the Wikimedia Sites,
and via a notification on WikimediaAnnounce-L or
a similar mailing list [25]
Microsoft’s privacy policy stated that it would notify users
in the event of significant changes, although did not specifically
state how consent was handled when changes are introduced;
We will update this privacy statement when neces-
sary to reflect customer feedback and changes in our
services. When we post changes to this statement,
we will revise the “last updated” date at the top of
the statement. If there are material changes to the
statement or in how Microsoft will use your per-
sonal data, we will notify you either by prominently
posting a notice of such changes before they take
effect or by directly sending you a notification. We
encourage you to periodically review this privacy
statement to learn how Microsoft is protecting your
information [26].
Their terms and conditions stated, however, that “Microsoft
reserves the right to update the TOU at any time without
notice to you”, indicating that it is likely Microsoft views
their policies as being changeable without user consent or
knowledge, in some cases [27]. This is backed up by their
use of the passive description of changes taking effect in
the privacy policy quoted above, rather than of users actively
agreeing to them.
The LinkedIn privacy policy stated that material modifica-
tions would be notified to users through the service or another
means, but that using the service after a notice is given, consent
is implied to the changes;
We may modify this Privacy Policy from time to
time, and if we make material changes to it, we
will provide notice through our Service, or by other
means so that you may review the changes before
you continue to use our Services. If you object to any
changes, you may close your account. Continuing to
use our Services after we publish or communicate
a notice about any changes to this Privacy Policy
means that you are consenting to the changes [28].
The eBay privacy policy stated that changes may be made
by adjusting the policy, and that significant changes would be
notified, with changes taking effect after 30 days;
We may amend this Privacy Notice at any time by
posting the amended terms on this site. All amended
terms automatically take effect 30 days after they are
posted. We will announce any material changes to
this Privacy Notice through the eBay Message Centre
and/or via email [29].
The Instagram privacy policy likewise stated that changes
may be made to the policy, and that users should review it
regularly, with optional notice being given for more significant
cahnges. There was also presumed consent ot changes if a user
accessed Instagram after the changes;
Instagram may modify or update this Privacy Policy
from time to time, so please review it periodically.
We may provide you additional forms of notice of
modifications or updates as appropriate under the
circumstances. Your continued use of Instagram or
the Service after any modification to this Privacy
Policy will constitute your acceptance of such mod-
ification [30].
VII. DISCUSSION
A number of common trends were identified within these
policies, raising a number of questions. Firstly, not all ser-
vices explicitly stated the duration of time between changes
being made available, and changes taking effect. Specifically,
Instagram, LinkedIn, Amazon, Yahoo and Google did not state
explicitly that a notification period would be given. Microsoft,
Twitter and Facebook mentioned a period of time but did
not specify it, or implied that changes did not take effect
immediately upon posting. eBay and Wikipedia expressly
stated a specific period of time which would be given to review
changes.
Secondly, the question of validity of consent was high-
lighted — Google, for example, promised not to reduce privacy
protections without explicit user consent, although did not state
that users would be offered any means to object to this change,
or to otherwise avoid it. Google has previously used implied
consent to significant privacy changes [31], as discussed earlier
with regard to their email to users in 2012. Of the services
investigated, Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Twitter, Wikipedia,
Microsoft, LinkedIn, eBay and Instagram all made statements
which indicated that consent to changes was implied, or which
stated that changes may be made and would take affect.
Amazon did not explicitly state this, although gave no details
as to how consent would be obtained, although their promise
to not reduce the protections on existing data may indicate that
express consent would be sought.
Thirdly, while the explicit or implicit nature of consent has
been considered, an equally, if not more important, consider-
ation is what happens in the event of a user not agreeing to
a change in policies. There are a variety of scenarios where
this raises a number of questions — a user may be travelling
abroad for an extended period of time without access to the
internet by choice, meaning they are unaware of changes being
imposed on policies to which they have agreed. Based upon
the basic premise of agreements such as these, these changes
would be considered as an offer to variation, and it would be
unreasonable to apply them to an unaware user [32]. Another
scenario where this may be problematic would be where a
user is incapacitated or hospitalised, and not in a state to view
length privacy policies or migrate data outwith services.
VIII. KEY OBSERVATIONS
As a result of carrying out this investigation, a number
of key findings were identified, which should be considered
in line with the discussion regarding enforcement of terms in
Section III. Specifically, these findings lead to a belief that;
• Almost all online services deem continued use of
a service as acceptance of new terms or policies,
irrespective of whether the user is made aware of the
changes, which is potentially not in-keeping with legal
precedent.
• Very few services promise to directly contact and
inform individual users of changes to policies. Most
say they may do this, but some services may only post
a message on their service website, or perhaps only
even update the policy.
• Some services say they will notify users of major
changes to their policy, although this is as determined
by the company itself, and in some cases the terms
state that only the company may determine if a change
is major.
• Service operators may in a position such that rights
in a policy or contract could be found significantly
imbalanced — a user must agree to arbitrary terms
to continue to access their own data on a service,
and their access to that data can be terminated if they
refuse to consent to the new terms.
• Many services state in their terms that user data may
be transferred to another company in the event of an
acquisition, merger or sale. The privacy protections
experienced here may well differ from what users
expect, or previously were in force.
In the case of policy updates, it should also be considered
that, on account of the wide use of smartphone applications,
not all users will encounter a notice of a change placed on the
homepage of a service. For example, many users of Google
services on Android will have had an account created during
the Android setup process, potentially within a retail store,
and may not ever use (or know their password for) the web
interface for these services. Additionally, especially on mobile
devices, users are often prompted to accept policies without
necessarily having even seen the policy - due to screen space
limitations and the lengths of these policies, the policy was
often made available by way of a hyperlink, which upon
clicking would open a new screen containing the policy in
question.
A. Safe Harbor Legislation
Another major consideration when reading privacy policies
and other legal documents, specifically pertaining to the usage
of internet services, is the jurisdiction under which contract is
governed. While most policies investigated stated this, there
can be considerable variation in legal protections for users
between jurisdictions. This is particularly clear when US and
European Union data protection laws are considered. The Safe
Harbor process previously allowed for companies to self-
declare their compliance with European law. This aimed to
remove the challenges faced with the EU’s comparatively heav-
ily regulated handling of private data (which is established as
a “fundamental right” [33]), in comparison with the relatively
hands-off approach taken in the US, where privacy protections
are typically implemented voluntarily by companies, in order
to prevent potential lawsuits [33]. Despite this, a European
court ruling recently led to the effective suspension of the
Safe Harbor provision [34]. In this case, Schrems brought a
case against Facebook Ireland Ltd. on account of its transfer
of EU citizens’ personal data to the United States, and its
storage there. The case centred around Schrems’ complaint
that Facebook’s transfer of his personal data to the United
States did not offer sufficient protections, and that he wished
to exercise his right to prohibit the transfer of such data, on
account of surveillance activities being carried out by public
authorities within the United States.
The Irish High Court found that, since US law did not
give EU citizens a right to be heard, and that oversight of
intelligence services was carried out through secret procedures,
it did not offer adequate protection. The end result was that
Decision 2000/520, which stated the European Commission
“may find that a third country ensures an adequate level of
protection”, and established that the Safe Harbor program
offered such protections, was reversed. This meant that data
transfers under Safe Harbor are no longer automatically valid,
and that legal challenge may be made to data being transferred
to the United States by European companies [34].
It is therefore clear that the treatment of personal data may
vary significantly between different countries and regulatory
systems — within the context of privacy policies, it is possible
that users may be asked to agree to the transfer of data to other
countries whose protections may not be sufficient, as was seen
in the case above regarding Facebook.
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRIVACY
As a result of these observations, some recommendations
are presented, to improve the fairness of privacy policies
for end-users. Firstly, all users should be made aware of all
changes to a privacy policy or other legal document governing
the use of provision of a service. This notification should be
made directly to the user, in plain language, and in an honest
and understandable way. There is a clear trade-off between
annoying users and ensuring they are informed of changes,
but given the legal precedents discussed in Section III, it is
necessary to ensure users are definitely made aware of changes.
In the meantime, use of a service such as TOSBack [35] may
help users to monitor services’ policies for changes, although
the addition of notifications for changes would be beneficial for
ensuring that users become aware of policy changes quickly,
such that they may react if they do not agree to them.
As an extension of the above, services should also seek
explicit consent when updated terms or policies are presented.
It should not be necessary for users to depend on third party
community services to ensure policies are not changed without
their knowledge. Ensuring such consent is given ensures that
users have directly consented to the variations in terms, and
that there is no presumption of consent. If a user no longer
uses a service, for example, their consent may be presumed
when the user was unaware of the alteration (and unwilling
to agree to it). By requiring explicit consent to all changes
(perhaps at subsequent logins, as some websites implement),
service operators know which users have consented directly to
the changes, and can separate user data which is not able to
be used under the updated policies..
Similarly, the tie between agreeing to new terms, and
being able to continue to use a service which has already
been available presents a question and challenge for further
discussion. If a user is prevented from accessing their data
until they agree to a new set of policies, they are arguably
being unfairly pressured into agreeing to a change in policies
or contract. This could well be the equivalent of being forced
to sign an agreement under duress, which would ordinarily
invalidate it. Nonetheless, this topic seems to require further
discussion, as it highlights and underpins the differing needs of
service users and providers. While service providers typically
wish to protect themselves from legal challenge over the use
of user data, and ensure their users understand the ways
data may be used by the provider, the user of a service
wishes to understand how their personal information is used,
and to exercise control over this to prevent use which they
do not consent to. By being able to balance these needs
(perhaps through providing access to the previously-offered
service for compatibility), a satisfactory outcome should be
able to be achieved, such that service providers may change
policies, but users may continue to use services which they are
reliant upon, without being coerced or forced into agreeing to
something they are unhappy with. When personal data is being
handled, the ability to challenge a change after the fact may
not necessarily offer a satisfactory remedy, since the personal
data may already have been shared or sold or otherwise used
without the user’s consent, and it cannot easily be “taken back”
after the fact.
Finally, existing standards (such as P3P) for the machine-
readable representation of privacy policies should be revisited,
as they offer significant benefit for those wishing to compare
privacy policies between websites. For these to be effective,
however, it would be necessary that service operators and
websites be bound by their P3P-stated policy, such that users
may allow their browser to make decisions based on web-
site policies. If service operators believed that their human-
readable policies were the canonical definition of their policies,
this would potentially allow for abuse, where sites would
place incorrect P3P policies on their site to mislead users into
disclosing information under false pretences.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed some of the legal and user-
facing considerations of privacy policies online, as well as
an approach to automatically locating them on websites, and
attempting to highlight important portions of these policies for
further review. This approach has been used to automatically
flag sections of privacy policies for further review, which
appear to present clauses which act against the legal precedents
explored. A set of observations across an analysis of many of
these policies from some of the most popular websites on the
internet was presented, and recommendations were made with
regard to specific concerns surrounding presumed or implied
consent to updated policies, and of the notification of users to
changes in such policies. Finally, the issue of the all-or-nothing
approach to the use of services has been highlighted, and the
potential risks of data lock-in being used to force users to agree
to changes to privacy policies or other legal documents under
what could be perceived as duress.
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